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Every Step You Take, I’ll Be Watching You:
Practical STEPAUTH-entication of RFID Paths
Kai Bu*, Member, IEEE, Yingjiu Li, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Path authentication thwarts counterfeits in RFID-
based supply chains. Its motivation is that tagged products taking
invalid paths are likely faked and injected by adversaries at
certain supply chain partners/steps. Existing solutions are path-
grained in that they simply regard a product as genuine if
it takes any valid path. Furthermore, they enforce distributed
authentication by offloading the sets of valid paths to some or all
steps from a centralized issuer. This not only imposes network
and storage overhead but also leaks transaction privacy.
We present STEPAUTH, the first step-grained path authen-
tication protocol that is practically efficient for authenticating
products with strict path bindings. We encode a path into a
secret with minimum path visibility disclosure between adjacent
steps. Carrying the secret, a product has to go through steps in
the exact order as in the designated path to pass authentication.
STEPAUTH enforces no tag computation and enables each step
to locally verify path secrets without pre-offloaded valid-path
sets. Toward an even higher security guarantee, STEPAUTH can
hinder an adversary capable of compromising all steps from
forging valid secrets. We make STEPAUTH practically efficient
by taking advantage of nested encryption and hybrid encryption.
To achieve a 128-bit security for a practically long path of 100
steps, STEPAUTH generates a secret around 10 KB, which can
be well supported by high-memory EPC Gen2 tags. Such secrets
take STEPAUTH less than 1 s to encode and around 10 ms to
verify.
Index Terms—RFID, path authentication, supply chain man-
agement.
I. INTRODUCTION
RADIO-Frequency Identification (RFID) paths have beenwidely used to reveal counterfeit products. In RFID-
enabled supply chains, tags affixed to products carry secrets re-
lated to the paths taken by products. Enroute readers deployed
at each step (i.e., a supply chain partner) of a path verify
products via authenticating their path secrets. The motivation
for path authentication is that injected counterfeits usually take
different paths than their authentic counterparts [1]. According
to a recent report by OECD and the EU’s Intellectual Property
Office in April 2016, global trade in counterfeit products worth
almost half a trillion dollars a year, accounting for around
2.5% of global imports [2]. The type of counterfeits ranges
from cheap eggs [3] to expensive jewelry [4] and from low-
end event tickets [5] to high-tech electronic devices [6]. Such
counterfeit products may impose various threats on consumers.
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For example, counterfeit luxuries cause financial loss to con-
sumers while counterfeit foods and electronic devices threat
consumers’ health and safety. Counterfeit detection based on
RFID paths is therefore practically imperative.
A. Related Work
The state of the art for RFID path authentication is quasi-
distributed and path-grained. The centralized issuer—knowing
all valid paths—offloads them to all or some steps, which act
as checkpoints. Enroute readers encode themselves into the
path secrets carried by passing tags. Checkpoints authenticate
a tag’s secret by verifying whether it can be derived by a
valid path pertaining to local valid-path sets. The pioneering
protocol, Pathchecker [1], uses the path ends as checkpoints
and enforces an O(n) authentication when deriving secrets
by one of n valid paths after another to compare with those
carried in tags. Moreover, Pathchecker requires tags to evolve
secrets, which involves complex cryptography toward security
and privacy. This makes it prohibitively computation-intensive
for low-cost tags [7]. TRACKER [7] relieves tags from compu-
tation by letting readers take over secret verification and up-
date. Cai et al. [8] and Wang et al. [9] improve upon TRACKER
by stronger privacy requirements and more compact secrets,
respectively. Mamun et al. [10] and Ray et al. [11] secure
tags against untrusted readers by reader authentication, which
again necessitates cryptographic computation requirements to
tags. Instead of waiting until the final stage of a supply chain
to reveal counterfeits, a two-level path authentication protocol
[12] segments a path and uses segment ends as checkpoints.
CHECKER [13] further generalizes this idea and enables each
reader to verify the validity of the path taken by a tag so far.
However, all these path-grained authentication protocols are
not well suited to enforce delivery regulation that requires
each product to follow a designated path. Take the build-to-
order supply chain management strategy [14] for example.
A manufacturer may need to deliver ordered or even cus-
tomized products to a specific retailer via a series of specified
distributors and wholesalers but not simply following any
other valid paths down the supply chain hierarchy. A feasible
way to adapt path-grained authentication is to augment each
reader with product-path bindings, which enable readers to
make delivery decision and verify delivery correctness. This,
however, incurs frequent issuer-reader communication upon
path update1 or distributing new products. Considering the
large volume of products in today’s supply chains (e.g., over
1For highly dynamic supply chains where paths are hard to predict, each
reader has to query the centralized issuer for online secret verification [15].
As with most related work, we focus on relatively stable supply chains.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF STEPAUTH WITH PATH-GRAINED AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOLS.
Legend: NTC: No Tag Computation; CP: Checkpoint; NPS: No Path Set
Legend: MPV: Minimal Path Visibility; SG: Step-grained
Protocol NTC CP NPS MPV SG
Pathchecker [1] 7 path end 7 7 7
Mamun et al. [10]
Ray et al. [11]
TRACKER [7] 3 path end 7 7 7
Cai et al. [8]
Wang et al. [9]
Two-level [12] 3 segment end 7 7 7
CHECKER [13] 3 each reader 7 7 7
Proxy Re-signature [17] 3 path end 7 3 7
STEPAUTH 3 each reader 3 3 3
480 million products on Amazon US [16]), exporting product-
path bindings to enroute readers would cause huge overhead of
network bandwidth and reader storage. What might be of more
concern to supply chain partners is that revealing valid paths
may leak their business strategies. Burbridge et al. [17] thus
advocate minimal path visibility that limits linkage disclosure
between only adjacent readers. It is, however, challenging
to implement the adopted proxy re-signature scheme in [17]
without a trusted third party [13].
B. Our Solution and Contributions
In this paper, we present STEPAUTH as the first practically
efficient protocol for distributed and step-grained path au-
thentication with minimal path visibility. Being step-grained,
STEPAUTH enforces a product to follow a succession of
ordered steps/readers, which constitute the designated path.
The major idea is to encode the designated path into a secret.
We use nested encryption to enforce the step order. Using
nested encryption, we recursively incorporate a step’s secret
into that of its previous step. STEPAUTH encrypts path secrets
in such a way that they reveal only two reader identifiers
to each reader. One is the identifier of the reader itself for
verifying delivery correctness and the other one is its next
step for making delivery decision. Each enroute reader thus
knows only its adjacent readers and guarantees minimal path
visibility. To guarantee both security and efficiency, we lever-
age hybrid encryption that uses symmetric cryptography to
efficiently encrypt and decrypt path secrets and uses public key
cryptography to encrypt and decrypt the symmetric key. For
the public key cryptography, we generate a pair of encryption
key kei and decryption key kdi for each reader Ri. A reader’s
symmetric key ksi is randomly generated and encrypted using
the encryption key kei upon secret construction. Neither the
issuer nor readers need to store these symmetric keys. Each
reader Ri is granted with its decryption key kdi when it
joins the supply chain and registers to the issuer. Readers
can thus use decryption keys to get symmetric keys and then
authenticate path secrets, without querying the issuer. This
guarantees fully distributed authentication. Toward an even
higher security guarantee, we further explore techniques to
prevent an adversary from forging a valid secret even if the
adversary can compromise all readers.
We highlight STEPAUTH’s major contributions as follows
while comparing STEPAUTH with prior path-grained authen-
tication protocols in Table I.
• We initiate the step-grained path authentication problem.
It helps to enforce a practical supply chain management
policy that delivers a product along a designated path.
Existing path authentication protocols are not well suited
to enforce such a policy as they allow a product to take
any valid path.
• We present STEPAUTH, the first protocol for step-grained
yet distributed path authentication. It encodes paths into
secrets and stores them in corresponding tags. Such
secrets enable each reader to locally authenticate tags and
make delivery decision without querying the issuer.
• STEPAUTH requires no tag computation and thus favors
low-cost tags.
• STEPAUTH guarantees minimal path visibility by not
offloading valid-path sets to readers.
• STEPAUTH can generate compact path secrets by lever-
aging nested encryption and hybrid encryption. We in-
vestigate implementation of STEPAUTH based on the
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
[18] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) [19]. Even for a practically long enough path
of 100 steps, the generated secrets that achieve a 128-
bit security by STEPAUTH are around 10 KB, which can
be well supported by high-memory EPC Gen2 tags. For
example, Marubeni Chemix and Xerafy have produced
tags with 8 KB memory [20] and Fujitsu further pushes
the boundary to 64 KB [21]. Based on the Crypto++ 5.6.0
Benchmarks [22], [23], STEPAUTH takes less than 1 s to
generate such secrets and around 10 ms to verify them.
• STEPAUTH is practically secure and privacy-preserving.
An attacker can breach tag/step unlinkability only if it
can compromise readers’ decryption keys while it cannot
forge a valid secret even if it compromises all readers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
models the step-grained path authentication problem. Sec-
tion III outlines STEPAUTH framework and design challenges.
Section IV and Section V detail the design and prove security
and privacy, respectively. Section VI explores implementation
choices and evaluates performance. Section VII discusses
potential limitations and suggests countermeasures. Finally,
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PATH AUTHENTICATION MADE STEP-GRAINED
In this section, we define the step-grained path authenti-
cation problem. For ease of understanding, we follow con-
ventional terms and notions in literature (e.g., [1], [7], [13]).
We adopt a simpler supply chain model yet stricter solution
requirements toward striving for previous solutions’ joint
benefits without forcing their sacrifices on efficiency, security,
or privacy. In a nutshell, we envision a solution that offers
distributed, step-grained path authentication with minimal path
visibility disclosure. Being distributed and step-grained, the
solution should enable each step on a path to independently
verify the path taken by a tag so far. A reader does not
need to query a centralized, trusted party upon verification.
Unlike existing path-grained solutions, the verification does
not accept a tag simply because its taken path pertains to a
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set of valid paths (or their beginning segments) preloaded to
final (or intermediate) steps. We observe that a tag following
a valid path cannot guarantee that the tag follows the correct
one. In practical supply chains, it is normal that a manufacturer
distributes multiple types of product across different valid
paths, but each of which may allow only certain types of
product. From the privacy perspective, the solution should also
limit minimal path visibility between adjacent steps to, for
example, protect business strategy of supply chain partners.
A. Supply Chain Model
A supply chain consists of a series of supply chain partners
(e.g., manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers)
that manufacture and circulate products [24]. It can be mod-
eled as a digraph G = (V,E) [7]. Each vertex v ∈ V
represents a supply chain partner. Each edge e = −−→vivj ∈ E
represents a business strategy allowing partner vi to deliver
products to partner vj . A path p of l consecutive edges
p = (e0, ..., ei, ei+1, ..., el−1) ∈ P , where ei.head = ei+1.tail
and P represents the set of valid paths, thus enforces a
policy on which partners a product can visit. Alternatively,
the above path p can be represented as l + 1 consecutive
partners p = (v0, ..., vj , vj+1, ..., vl), where −−−−→vjvj+1 ∈ E and
vj is usually called a step on the path [1]. We assume that
the designated path of a product is known as a priori. This
resonates with the build-to-order supply chain management
strategy, which favors more of customer needs and improves
manufacturer competitiveness [14]. Instead of manufacturers
aimlessly producing products to sell, they reactively schedule
production according to received product orders. For example,
if two retailers—A and B—plan to purchase some products
from a wholesaler, they need to respectively submit an order
to the wholesaler. The orders will be further submitted to a
distributor and a manufacturer. Then the manufacturer is aware
of the binding of products and paths.
RFID-enabled supply chains leverage RFID technology to
implement product tracking [1]. Each product is affixed with
an RFID tag carrying product related data. Tag genuine-
ness serves as an important indicator of product authenticity.
Deployed RFID readers interact with tags for genuineness
verification. The RFID-enabled supply chain we adopt consists
of three types of entities, that is, an issuer I, a set R of readers,
and a set T of tags.
1) Issuer I: The issuer is a manufacturer with the knowl-
edge of product-path couplings. For path authentication, issuer
I generates a secret out of each tag’s designated path and
loads the path secret to the tag. Path secrets inside tags should
vary stepwise to avoid tracking attacks. The issuer needs to
accordingly configure readers in such a way that they can
verify and update path secrets. Such reader configurations are
deemed secure because readers have sufficient storage space
and computation resources to support secure wired or wireless
communication [7].
2) Reader: Ri ∈ R, where 0 ≤ i ≤ |R| − 1. Each
step is equipped with a reader to communicate with tags
attached to products2. Reader-tag communication is against
2We use “step” and “reader” interchangeably whenever no confusion arises.
an insecure wireless channel because resource-constrained tags
can hardly afford complex cryptography [25]. For distributed
path authentication, we require that each reader locally verify
path secrets without querying a centralized party with global
knowledge of tag-path bindings. To do so, each reader should
be pre-granted by the issuer necessary data (e.g., keys) that
helps to verify the validity of path secrets. Furthermore, a
reader needs also to update path secrets for its next-hop reader,
if any, to verify.
3) Tag: Tj ∈ T , where 0 ≤ j ≤ |T | − 1. Each tag is
attached to a product, whose authenticity is implied by tag
genuineness. It features memory space and supports read and
write operations by readers. Normally, a tag stores a unique ID
as well as product related data. We in this paper focus on path
secrets. Given a set of S valid secrets, let skTj represent the kth
secret of tag Tj , where k ≥ 0. The secret of tag Tj is initialized
as s0Tj by the issuer. If passing a reader’s verification, it will
be updated by the reader from skTj to s
k+1
Tj
.
Based on the preceding definitions, we formalize the follow-
ing functions featured by the issuer (INITIALIZE) and readers
(READ, VERIFY, UPDATE, WRITE) [1], [13].
• INITIALIZE : T ×P → S generates the initial path secret
s0Tj for tag Tj using its designated path pTj .
• READ : T → S reads tag Tj’s current secret skTj .
• VERIFY : S × R → {0, 1} verifies the validity of secret
skTj read from tag Tj .
VERIFY(skTj , d
aux
Ri
) =


1, if Tj’s current step
in pTj is Ri;
0, otherwise,
(1)
where dauxRi represents auxiliary data of reader Ri needed
for verifying skTj . For example, if s
k
Tj
is encrypted with
the issuer’s secret key, dauxRi might contain the issuer’s
public key for Ri to decrypt skTj .
• UPDATE : S × R → S updates the secret from skTj to
sk+1Tj .
UPDATE(skTj , d
aux
Ri
) = sk+1Tj .
• WRITE : S → T writes the updated secret sk+1Tj to tag Tj .
For simplicity, we also use WRITE to denote the function
for issuer I to load initial path secrets.
Among these five functions, INITIALIZE, VERIFY, and UP-
DATE are of more design challenge [1], [13].
B. Adversary Model
We consider a global active adversary A against a path
authentication protocol’s security and privacy. Following the
assumption by existing path authentication protocols, the ad-
versary can compromise readers but cannot compromise the
issuer.
To breach security, adversary A’s primary goal is to forge
path secrets that can pass the authentication protocol3. Once
3Note that an adversary may also sabotage path authentication. For example,
it can make authentic products fail authentication through writing invalid
secrets to their attached tags. Such an attack can be mitigated by lightweight
mutual authentication schemes [26]. We, however, focus on an adversary with
more incentives to inject counterfeits into a supply chain than to subvert it.
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such forged secrets are found, A can program them to tags and
attach the tags to counterfeits, which are likely circulated as
authentic ones and endanger potential customers. Adversary
A may conduct various other active attacks to increase the
chance of forging valid secrets. For example, A with physical
tampering capability can crack tag memory or even reader
memory, acquiring path secrets and keys used to update them.
Adversary A may also infer tag privacy using acquired data.
A global adversary can eavesdrop on tags’ communication or
launch its other capable attacks at all steps in the supply chain.
It might mount a subordinate adversary at each step and then
synthesize their acquired data to a centralized one. Although
the assumed global adversary overestimates practical attacking
resources, it forces us to design a more robust protocol than
when we consider a localized adversary attacking only a limit-
ed number of steps. Inferred tag privacy includes, for example,
which path a tag took [7]. We will shortly introduce specific
privacy concerns when reasoning about design requirements
for path authentication.
Throughout this paper, we assume that adversary A is
probabilistic polynomial time bounded in terms of a security
parameter such as 128 bits.
C. Step-Grained Path Authentication Problem
We advocate fine-grained RFID path authentication with
step granularity. Specifically, each product should follow a
designated path. Such a tag-path binding yields a practically
stricter requirement—an acceptable tag should visit the exact
steps in its designated path following the exact order. Previous
solutions are, however, path-grained; they accept a tag simply
if it takes any path among all valid ones. In many supply
chains, not all products can take all valid paths. Take the
pharmaceutical supply chain for example [27]. An American
pharmaceutical manufacturer might distribute its products na-
tionwide as well as export them to other countries like China.
Then packages without specific Chinese instructions on uses,
dosage, precautions, and drug interactions should be prohibited
from paths toward China, although which are valid paths. Note
that it is not practically efficient to simply issuing the bindings
of tagged products and their designated paths to steps; we will
shortly present the reasons in Section II-D.
1) Step-grained path authentication problem: Given tag
Tj’s designated l-step path of consecutive readers Ri, pTj =
(R0, ..., Ri, ..., Rl−1), Tj can pass the step-grained path au-
thentication if it satisfies the following equation:
l−1∏
i=0
VERIFY(siTj , d
aux
Ri
) = 1,
where function VERIFY is defined in Equation 1.
A feasible solution should guarantee authentication correct-
ness and security, protect participating entities’ privacy, and
promise efficiency under practical constraints.
2) Correctness: The solution should have no false neg-
atives and negligible false positives. First, a false negative
occurs when tag Tj faithfully follows its designated path pTj
but fails the authentication, that is,
∃Ri ∈ pTj : VERIFY(siTj , d
aux
Ri
) = 0.
Second, a false positive occurs when a tag with invalid state
sinvalid is accepted by a reader, that is,
∃sinvalid /∈ S and ∃Ri ∈ R : VERIFY(sinvalid, dauxRi ) = 1.
If Ri happens to be path end, sinvalid may make a tag pass
path authentication. We consider such false positives as an
intrinsic property of cryptography; they are proved negligible
by established cryptographic functions. Moreover, such false
positives are different from the odds for adversary A to forge
a valid secret. The latter is deemed as a security breach.
3) Security: A secure solution should guarantee that a
probabilistic polynomial time bounded adversary A cannot
forge a valid secret sadv with probability better than random
guessing, that is, for any sadv ∈ Spossible chosen by adversary
A and for any Ri ∈ pTj :
Pr(VERIFY(sadv, dauxRi ) = 1) ≤
|S
Tj
Ri
|
|Spossible|
+ ǫ,
where STjRi ⊆ S represents the set of valid secret(s) for tag Tj
on the (i− 1)th step Ri, Spossible ⊇ S represents all possible
but not necessarily valid secrets, and ǫ is negligible.
4) Privacy: Besides preventing security breach, the solution
should also avoid privacy leakage. Privacy concerns in the
literature fall into two categories, privacy and unlinkability [7].
Privacy protects the exact value of certain secret information
while unlinkability thwarts correlating transformed secrets
(e.g., via encryption) with tags. Both privacy and unlinkability
can be required with granularity of tag, step, or path.
• Identity/Step/Path privacy requires that adversary A can-
not disclose which ID/steps/path a tag corresponds to.
• Tag unlinkability requires that adversary A cannot corre-
late secrets with a tag.
• Step/Path unlinkability requires that adversary A cannot
tell whether two tags visit common steps or take the same
path.
Blass et al. find that 1) for a single tag, tag unlinkability is
stronger than identity/step/path privacy, and 2) for two tags,
step unlinkability is stronger than path unlinkability [7]. If the
solution can satisfy tag unlinkability and step unlinkability, it
satisfies other privacy/unlinkability requirements as well.
5) Constraints: We expect that the solution can efficiently
satisfy the preceding requirements under practical constraints.
• Tags perform no computation. Such a complexity con-
straint makes the solution affordable to widely-deployed
low-cost EPC Class 1 Generation 2 tags [28].
• Readers verify path secrets independently (or distribut-
edly). Such an architecture constraint enriches robustness
and privacy. First, at each step, not querying a centralized
server for secret verification avoids single point of failure.
Second, keeping path secrets away from a centralized
server further protects supply chain partners’ privacy. For
example, a partner may not want the centralized server
to track its transactions in real time.
• Steps limit minimal path visibility between adjacent
readers. Such a policy constraint protects supply chain
partners’ business strategies [17]. For correct product
delivery, a reader should know to which next hop to
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transfer a product. Similarly, a reader should also know
from which previous hop it receives a product. More
specifically, assume that −−−−−−−−→Ri−1RiRi+1 is a segment of
a designated path. Minimal path visibility requires that
Ri know only Ri−1 and Ri+1 [17] rather than any other
readers on the path (e.g., Ri−2 or Ri+2) [17].
D. Why Not to Adapt Path-Grained Authentication
One may consider step-grained authentication trivially solv-
able by incremental adaptation of previous path-grained so-
lutions. We acknowledge the feasibility of such an adaption
because a designated path represents only one specific instance
of valid paths. A feasible adaptation should introduce tag-path
bindings that specify which designated path a tagged product
should follow. That is, we would grant each step with an
additional list of such tag-path bindings. Only tags passing
path authentication and belonging to the list are accepted.
This incremental adaptation, however, induces heavy over-
head in terms of communication (for the issuer to populate
tag-path bindings to steps), storage (for steps to store tag-
path bindings), and time (for steps to search over tag-path
bindings). Consider, for example, when delivering n tagged
products along an l-step designated path. Each step Ri should
store the following tag-path binding:
Ri−1, Ri, Ri+1 : information of n tags from Ri−1 to Ri+1
via Ri.
The information of a tag could be its ID together with other
related product metadata. Let |taginfo| denote the size of such
information for a tag. Then the storage overhead for each
step is O(|taginfo| × n). Distributing such information to all
l steps by the issuer introduces a communication overhead of
O(|taginfo| × n× l). Upon path authentication, a step needs
to first extract useful metadata from a path secret and then to
search whether the medadata is in the issuer-granted list. This
search process costs an average time complexity of O(log n)
and a worst-cast time complexity of O(n). Considering the
huge volume of products in nowadays supply chains, the
preceding types of overhead might be heavy and reduce a
significant amount of profit.
Furthermore, the preceding storage and communication
overhead may be much higher in anonymous RFID systems
where tag IDs are not revealed to readers [29], [30]. In such
systems, a step/reader Ri cannot simply link tag IDs to a path
directive (i.e., Ri−1, Ri, Ri+1). Instead, it may need to store
expected path secrets inside incoming tags. Cryptographic
path secrets derived over tag IDs and designated paths are
much larger in size than tag IDs. They, therefore, take more
communication overhead for the issuer to grant them to readers
and take more storage overhead on readers.
STEPAUTH, on the other hand, does not suffer from the
overwhelming overhead for distributing, storing, and searching
over tag-path bindings. Besides a comparative communication
overhead for initializing reader keys as path-grained authen-
tication, STEPAUTH imposes only an O(1) storage overhead
and an O(1) search overhead on each reader, regardless of
the number of tags on the designated path and the path length
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Fig. 1. STEPAUTH enables each step to locally VERIFY and UPDATE in-tag
path secrets, which also instruct a step which next step to forward the tag.
Valid secrets sA, sB, and sC can pass authentication at steps A, B, and C,
respectively. Forged (e.g., sf to step B) or misdelivered (e.g., sC to step D,
or eavesdropped sA to step D) secrets should fail the authentication.
(Section IV-E for analysis and Section VI-E for evaluation).
To the best of our knowledge, STEPAUTH takes the first step
toward a step-grained path authentication solution with all
requirements of correctness, security, privacy, and efficiency
satisfied.
III. STEPAUTH OVERVIEW
In this section, we outline STEPAUTH, a step-grained
path authentication protocol that satisfies the requirements
of correctness, security, privacy, and efficiency defined in
Section II-C. STEPAUTH follows a recursive design. For each
step, after receiving a tag, it verifies the path secret inside to
make sure that 1) it is the current step on the designated path
and 2) which is the next step, updates the path secret such
that the next step can verify it in the same way, and finally
forwards the tag with updated secret to the next step.
A. Framework
In a nutshell, STEPAUTH enforces a strict secret-step cou-
pling. That is, at any time, a valid secret would pass the
authentication only at its expected step. As shown in Figure 1,
valid secrets sA, sB, and sC can pass authentication at steps
A, B, C, respectively, rather than any other steps. STEPAUTH
enables each step to locally verify and update path secrets
without querying the centralized issuer. Forged or misdelivered
secrets should be prohibited from being authenticated. From
privacy perspective, STEPAUTH should also hinder the attacker
from correlating secrets sA, sB, and sC.
For step-grained path authentication of tag Tj , STEPAUTH
consists of two key phases (Algorithm 1). In the first phase,
issuer I generates the initial secret s0Tj based on Tj’s des-
ignated path pTj = (R0, ..., Ri, ..., Rl−1) and each enroute
reader Ri’s auxiliary data dauxRi (e.g., domain parameters)(line 3). The configuration of dauxRi varies per specific secret
generation technique. The issuer then stores initial secret
s0Tj to Tj (line 4) and distributes initialized Tj to the first
step/reader R0 on the designated path (line 5). STEPAUTH now
proceeds to the second phase where each reader recursively
follows the same procedures. Upon receiving tag Tj , reader
R0 reads its secret s0Tj (line 8) for verification (line 9). If
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Algorithm 1: STEPAUTH:
a STEP-Grained Path AUTHentication
Input : Tag Tj ’s designated path pTj = (R0, ..., Ri, ..., Rl−1);
Auxiliary data dauxRi of each Ri ∈ pTj
Output: Path authentication result of tag Tj : AUTH(Tj)
1 AUTH(Tj)← 0;
2 //the issuer generates the initial path secret;
3 s0Tj
← INITIALIZE(pTj , ∀Ri ∈ pTj : d
aux
Ri
);
4 Tj ← WRITE(s0Tj );
5 Issue Tj to the first step/reader R0;
6 //recursive operations by each reader on the designated path;
7 foreach Ri ∈ pTj do
8 siTj
← READ(Tj);
9 if VERIFY(siTj , d
aux
Ri
) = 1 then
10 Ri+1, s
i+1
Tj
← UPDATE(siTj , d
aux
Ri
);
11 Tj ← WRITE(si+1Tj );
12 if i < l− 1 then
13 Ship Tj to Ri+1, which is the next step;
14 else
15 Keep Tj and sell it to a customer at the point of sale;
16 else
17 return AUTH(Tj);
18 AUTH(Tj)← 1;
19 return AUTH(Tj);
verification succeeds, R0 updates the secret from s0Tj to s
1
Tj(line 10), writes it to Tj (line 11), and ships it to the next
step R1 (line 13). Otherwise, Tj fails secret verification and
thus path authentication (line 17). R1 and subsequent enroute
readers perform the same operations (lines 7-17). For ease
of presentation, we introduce the following binary indicator
AUTH(Tj) to demonstrate authentication success with value 1
or failure with value 0.
AUTH(Tj) =
{
1, if ∀Ri ∈ pTj : VERIFY(siTj , d
aux
Ri
) = 1;
0, if ∃Ri ∈ pTj : VERIFY(siTj , d
aux
Ri
) = 0.
B. Challenges
Among the operations required in Algorithm 1, three are key
design challenges—INITIALIZE, VERIFY, and UPDATE. All of
them operate on path secrets and are highly correlated. On one
hand, how to VERIFY and UPDATE path secrets depends on
how INITIALIZE generates path secrets. On the other hand,
how to INITIALIZE path secrets should take into account how
to simplify VERIFY and UPDATE for imposing less resource
demand on readers and tags.
We now dissect construction requirements for path secrets.
From functionality perspective, a path secret should satisfy the
following two requirements.
• Req 1. For step-grained path authentication, secret siTj
can help reader Ri to check whether it is the current step
on the designated path.
• Req 2. For product delivery along the designated path,
secret siTj can help reader Ri to determine the correct
next step Ri+1. (Note that a path secret does not need
to contain information for verifying previous hop, which
can be implied by secret validity.)
From a security and privacy perspective, the path secret should
satisfy three other requirements.
• Req 3. For securing the path secret, secret siTj for reader
Ri cannot be decrypted by an adversary or other readers
without compromising reader Ri.
• Req 4. For securing the path authentication protocol, an
adversary or readers cannot forge a valid secret without
compromising any encryption keys.
• Req 5. For protecting path privacy, a path secret should
keep minimal path visibility between adjacent readers.
Note that Reqs 3-5 are not sufficient for tag/step unlinkability.
We will explore sufficient techniques for satisfying them upon
presenting STEPAUTH design.
C. Basic Design and Limitations
A basic implementation of STEPAUTH is simply chaining
path secrets for each step. Consider a three-step path −−−→ABC
for example. To make step A ensure that it is the current step
(Req 1) and B is the next step (Req 2), the secret for step A
should include A and B. The secret should also be kept secret
from adversaries (Req 3) and hard to forge (Req 4). We can
accordingly encrypt the secret using a secret key stored on
the secure issuer. To limit path visibility, the secret for step A
should reveal no more path information other than A and B
(Req 5). Following the similar principles for steps B and C,
we can construct the path secret for −−−→ABC as the following.
EnckA(A,B)||EnckB(B,C)||EnckC(C), (2)
where kA, kB, and kC denote the secret keys of A, B, and C,
respectively.
As we mentioned, Reqs 3-5 are not sufficient for tag/step
unlinkability. The secret by Equation 2 applies to all tags
following the same path −−−→ABC. This violates both tag unlinka-
bility and step unlinkability if the encryption function Enc(·)
is deterministic.
• First, to guarantee step unlinkability, we should random-
ize secrets for tags on the same path.
EnckA(A,B,Rand(Tj)||EnckB(B,C,Rand(Tj))||
EnckC(C,Rand(Tj)).
Since tag IDs are unique across all tags and usually
incorporated in path secrets for ease of identification, we
use tag Tj’s ID as the seed for randomization Rand(·)4.
• Second, to guarantee tag unlinkability, the secret of a tag
should also vary stepwise. We can introduce a pair of
encryption and decryption keys for each pair of adjacent
readers. Then a step encrypts the secret using the pair-
wise key before delivering the tag to the next step. This
way, same secrets are differently encrypted on different
steps and deter tag correlation.
The basic STEPAUTH design is limited in both efficiency
and practicality. First, repeating Rand(Tj) for step unlinka-
bility exacerbates tag memory cost. Second, it is laborious
or even insecure for the issuer to set up pair-wise keys for
each pair of neighboring readers. Reader neighborhood is less
stable in practical RFID-based supply chains. Partners may
4Rand(Tj) acts as a random initialization vector if Enc(·) is probabilistic.
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become neighbors because of new transactions. Readers may
frequently join or leave in dynamic supply chains [15]. One
may consider letting two readers independently exchange keys
using, for example, Diffie-Hellman. But without a trusted third
party as a certificate authority, Diffie-Hellman key exchange
is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack [31].
IV. STEPAUTH CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we construct STEPAUTH toward practically
efficient, distributed, and step-grained authentication of RFID
paths. It generates compact path secrets based on a nested
encryption technique, which frees STEPAUTH of repeating
random fields Rand(Tj) and of exchanging keys for neigh-
boring readers. We also leverage hybrid encryption to reap
both the security of public key cryptography and the efficiency
of symmetric cryptography. Each reader needs to be granted
only one decryption key for public key encryption upon the
reader’s join. Keys for symmetric encryption are included in
tag states instead. Encryption keys for public key cryptography
to construct tag states are stored on the secure issuer.
A. Nested Encryption
An intuitive way to generate a path secret that satisfies Reqs
1-5 (Section III-B) is nesting a step’s secret in that of its
previous hop. Consider a three-step path −−−→ABC for example.
Using nested encryption, we can initialize A’s secret as:
EnckA(A,B,EnckB(B,C,EnckC(C))).
The plaintext first includes identities of A and B. This makes
A ensure that it is the current step and B is the next step (Reqs
1 and 2). Using A’s key for encryption guarantees that neither
an adversary nor other readers can decrypt its secret (Req 3).
A’s secret should also include the secret for next-hop B to
verify.
EnckB(B,C,EnckC(C)).
Since it is encrypted using B’s key, A cannot decrypt it and
thus cannot know which is B’s next step if any (Req 5). B
performs the same operations on the state as A does. That is,
B first verifies that it is the current step and C is the next step;
then it forwards the following updated secret to C.
EnckC(C).
After decrypting the secret, C finds only its identifier within
and thus knows that it is the path end. Since all secrets are
encrypted with readers’ encryption keys stored on the issuer,
an attacker cannot forge a valid secret without compromising
the issuer or any encryption keys (Req 4). Furthermore, secrets
vary at each step and thus promise tag unlinkability.
The preceding design, however, should be enhanced toward
step unlinkability. If we encrypt only C’s identifier into the
secret, all tags on the same path will have the same initial
secret using deterministic encryption. This violates step un-
linkability. In addition, it is difficult to identify the tag at the
last step, which is necessary in RFID applications. To address
such an issue, we add tag ID into the secret and leverage the
uniqueness of tag IDs to randomize secrets for tags following
the same path. To avoid any ambiguity, we repeat the identifier
of the last step in the initial secret as the following.
EnckA(A,B,EnckB(B,C,EnckC(C,C, Tj))). (3)
Then if a reader finds itself designated as the “next step” of its
own, the reader determines that it is the last step and terminates
product delivery.
B. Hybrid Encryption
Generating path secrets using purely public key cryptogra-
phy (Equation 3) is not practically efficient. First, the maxi-
mum length of the message to be encrypted is upper bounded
by the size of the encryption key. For example, it is well known
that a 1024-bit (128 bytes) RSA key can encrypt a message of
length up to 117 bytes following the PKCS#1 v1.5 standard
[32]. Since the length of secrets defined in Equation 3 expands
with path length, generating long enough keys in favor of long
paths would incur heavy computation overhead to the issuer
and bandwidth overhead to the issuer-reader channel. Second,
public key encryption is much less efficient than symmetric
encryption by several orders of magnitude [33]. It induces a
heavy overhead for the issuer and readers to process a large
amount of tags.
To boost authentication efficiency, we leverage the wisdom
of hybrid encryption. Specifically, hybrid encryption uses
symmetric cryptography to encrypt/decrypt a message while
the symmetric key is encrypted by public key cryptogra-
phy [34]. Let us apply hybrid encryption to generate the
last step C’s secret in the preceding example. The message
(C,C, Tj) now is encrypted using a random symmetric key
ksC—EncksC(C,C, Tj). To make C capable of decrypting the
ciphertext, the issuer should include ksC in step C’s secret. If
the issuer directly include the plaintext of ksC, an eavesdropper
can also decrypt the secret and breach tag/step privacy. Even
worse still, an attacker can forge a secret and breach security.
To guarantee security and privacy, the issuer therefore encrypts
ksC using an encryption key keC. The decryption key kdC
corresponding to keC is pre-loaded to step C. This way, we
can construct step C’s secret as the following.
secretC = Encke
C
(ksC),EncksC(C,C, Tj). (4)
Upon receiving the above secret, step C first decrypts
Encke
C
(ksC) using kdC and gets ksC. Then it decrypts the
remaining part using ksC and determines that it is the last step
because of double C’s. Similarly, B and A’s secrets can be
constructed as in Equation 5 and Equation 6, respectively.
secretB = Encke
B
(ksB),EncksB(B,C, secret
C). (5)
secretA = Encke
A
(ksA),EncksA(A,B, secret
B). (6)
The first step A’s secret in Equation 6 is the initial secret to be
assigned to the tag. Hybrid encryption promises efficiency for
secret generation and verification without sacrificing security
and privacy, given that the hybrid encryption is secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks [18].
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C. Secret Forgery Attack Resistance
If an attacker can compromise any encryption key kei
of reader Ri, the attacker can forge a “valid” secret that
enables Ri to accept the secret-augmented product and deliver
the product to any next hop whose valid secrets have been
overheard. The attacker may compromise reader Ri to obtain
its decryption key kdi and domain parameters, with which the
encryption key kei of Ri might be derived. Take the valid
secretB of B in Equation 5 for example. Consider an attacker
that overhears secretB, compromises another reader, say D,
and derives its encryption key keD. Then the attacker can forge
the following secret so as to enable −−−→DBC to be accepted as a
designated path.
secretD = Encke
D
(ksD),EncksD(D,B, secret
B),
where ksD is a randomly generated symmetric key by D. In
an extreme case, an omnipotent attacker may compromise all
readers and their encryption keys. It can generate a valid secret
for any path it wants to take as if it were the issuer.
To thwart such a secret forgery attack, we further augment
a secret with the issuer’s signature. The major enhancement is
that the issuer uses the same domain parameters to generate
a key pair (kpub, ksec), of which the public key kpub is
distributed to each reader upon it joins the supply chain and
the secret key ksec is used for the issuer to sign secrets for
each step. Upon the signature enhancement, the attacker may
generate the following secret to ensure −−−→DBC to be accepted
as a designated path.
secretD+ = Encke
D
(ksD),EncksD(D,B, secret
B+),
Sigksec(EnckeD(k
s
D),EncksD(D,B, secret
B+)),
where we have
secretB+ = Encke
B
(ksB),EncksB(B,C, secret
C+),
Sigksec(EnckeB(k
s
B),EncksB(B,C, secret
C+)),
and
secretC+ = Encke
C
(ksC),EncksC(C,C, Tj),
Sigksec(EnckeC(k
s
C),EncksC(C,C, Tj)).
Since the valid secret should be signed by the issuer with its
secret key ksec, an attacker cannot forge a valid secret without
compromising the issuer. In other words, even if the attacker
compromises all readers, it can only verify or update valid
secrets instead of forging one.
Based on nested encryption, hybrid encryption, and the
preceding unforgeable signature scheme, we next detail how
to construct INITIALIZE, VERIFY, and UPDATE.
D. Design: INITIALIZE, VERIFY, and UPDATE
1) Configuration: The only configuration for STEPAUTH
to enable INITIALIZE, VERIFY, and UPDATE is assigning
and distributing keys for public key cryptography. Upon a
reader joins the supply chain and registers to the issuer,
the issuer generates a pair of encryption key and decryption
key from system-wide domain parameters for the reader. The
Algorithm 2: INITIALIZE by Issuer I
Input : Tag Tj ’s designated path pTj = (R0, ..., Ri, ..., Rl−1);
Encryption key kei and auxiliary data daux of each Ri ∈ pTj ;
Secret key ksec of the issuer;
Output: Initial secret of tag Tj : s0Tj
1 s0Tj
← null;
2 //the issuer generates the initial path secret by calling function H;
3 s0Tj
← H(0);
4 //definition of recursive function H based on an intermediate function F;
5 H(i) = F(i), Sigksec (F(i));
6 //Sig(·) is for the issuer to sign the secret;
7 for F(i) do
8 ksi ← a random symmetric key the issuer generates for Ri;
9 if i = l− 1 then
10 F(i) = Encke
l−1
(ks
l−1),Encksl−1
(Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj);
11 else
12 F(i) =
Encke
i
(ksi),Encksi (Ri, Ri+1,F(i+ 1), Sigksec (F(i+ 1)));
13 //Enc(·) is performed with auxiliary data daux;
14 return s0Tj ;
issuer keeps the encryption key and securely transmits the
decryption key and domain parameters to the reader. An
alternative and lighter way is to let each reader generate a
key pair using the same domain parameters chosen by the
issuer. Then each reader sends its encryption key only to the
issuer through a secure channel, and the issuer can use the
domain parameters to verify each encryption key following
public key cryptography standard. In this case, the issuer does
not know readers’ decryption keys; it thus promises an even
higher security guarantee to prudential supply chain partners.
Against the secret forgery attack (Section IV-C), the issuer
further generates a pair of public key and secret key. The
issuer’s public key is also transmitted to each reader. Readers’
encryption keys and the issuer’s secret key will be used for the
issuer to INITIALIZE path secrets, which are then written to
corresponding tags. Key distribution and secret initialization
are all what the issuer needs to do. The readers themselves
will locally VERIFY and UPDATE path secrets carried in tags.
Besides the same set of domain parameters, each reader should
also be informed of reader-ID length |Ri|. That is, domain
parameters and |Ri| constitute the auxiliary data dauxRi . Since
dauxRi is identical across all readers, we hereafter use d
aux for
brevity.
2) INITIALIZE: The issuer generates initial secret s0Tj by
calling a recursive function H (Algorithm 2). Its main design
principle is nested encryption, which should be fed with
identifiers of tag Tj and each reader Ri on the designated
path as well as encryption key kei for each reader Ri and the
secret key ksec of the issuer. Readers’ encryption keys and
the issuer’s secret key are secure on the issuer. Corresponding
decryption key kdi of reader Ri and public key kpub of the
issuer are used for future secret verification by reader Ri.
As for symmetric keys ksi ’s for each Ri toward efficient
hybrid encryption, the issuer generates them randomly upon
initializing secrets. The issuer does not need to remember any
of them after their usage.
Although secret verification starts from the first step (Algo-
rithm 1), H composes s0Tj starting from the last step. For ease
of presentation, we introduce another intermediate function F
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(lines 7-13), which is called by H as the following (line 5).
H(i) = F(i), Sigksec(F(i)).
The repetition of two Rl−1’s (line 10) helps Rl−1 to determine
that it is the last step on the designated path. Rl−1 thus has no
next hop to forward the product. Finally, H(0) is assigned to
initial secret s0Tj (line 3), which is written to Tj by the issuer.
3) VERIFY: To verify the validity of secret siTj (Algorith-
m 3), Ri first verifies the issuer’s signature Sigksec(F(i)) using
the issuer’s public key kpub (line 1). Only if the signature
verification succeeds can secret verification proceed as follows.
Ri first truncates the verified signature Sigksec(F(i)) from
siTj (line 2). Ri then decrypts the first field of siTj using its
decryption key kdi to get the symmetric key ksi (line 3). We
then use ksi to decrypt the second field of siTj (lines 4-5).
Let Plain(siTj ) denote the corresponding decrypted plaintext.
Assume that Tj takes the designated path. If Ri is the last
step (i.e., Rl−1), Plain(siTj ) is (Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj). Otherwise,
Plain(siTj ) is (Ri, Ri+1,F(i + 1)), Sigksec(F(i + 1))), that
is, (Ri, Ri+1,H(i + 1)). In both cases, Ri matches with the
first |Ri| bits of Plain(siTj ). Based on this observation, we
compare Ri with the leftmost |Ri| bits of Plain(siTj ) for
verifying siTj (line 5). If a match is found, it means that
Ri is the correct current step and secret verification succeeds
(line 8). Otherwise, Ri is not supposed to be the current step
and secret verification fails (line 10). Verification success and
failure respectively return 1 and 0 according to the definition
of VERIFY (Equation 1).
4) UPDATE: If secret siTj passes verification, Ri needs to
update it to si+1Tj for the next step Ri+1 if any (Algorithm 4).
Ri first checks whether it is the last step, that is, whether
there is a next step Ri+1. For the last step Rl−1, Plain(siTj )
derived in Algorithm 3 (line 5) would be Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj . It
repeats the identifier Rl−1 twice. Based on this observation,
we can determine that Ri is the last step if the leftmost two
consecutive |Ri| bits are identical (line 3). Last step Rl−1 may
update the secret as the tag ID Tj (line 5). If Ri has a next
step Ri+1, it first determines the identifier of Ri+1 by the
second |Ri| bits of (lines 7-8). After removing Ri and Ri+1
from Plain(siTj ), the remaining part H(i + 1) is assigned to
si+1Tj (line 9). Ri now can forward Tj with updated secret
si+1Tj to Ri+1. In the same way, Ri+1 follows Algorithm 3
and Algorithm 4 to verify and update si+1Tj , respectively.
E. Discussions
1) Complexity: Table II provides the complexity of
STEPAUTH functions. When the issuer generates the initial
secret for an l-step path, INITIALIZE calls a recursive function
that casts a step’s secret into that of its previous step. For
each step, the computation involves a symmetric encryption,
a public key encryption, and a signature computation, which
account for an O(1) complexity. INITIALIZE thus takes an
O(l) complexity to generate the initial secret for an l-step path.
Upon the secret arrives at each reader, the reader performs
signature verification, decryption, and string comparison for
VERIFY and string truncation for UPDATE. Both take an O(1)
complexity.
Algorithm 3: VERIFY by Reader Ri
Input : Secret siTj ;
Ri’s decryption key kdi and auxiliary data daux;
The issuer’s public key kpub (stored on each reader);
Output: Verification result: 1 if success, 0 if failure
1 if siTj .Sigksec(F(i)) is verified by kpub then
2 siTj
← siTj with rightmost Sigksec (F(i)) removed;
3 ksi ← Deckd
i
(siTj .F(i).Enck
e
i
(ksi));
4 siTj
← siTj with leftmost Enckei (k
s
i) removed;
5 Plain(siTj )← Deck
s
i
(siTj );
6 //Dec(·) is performed with auxiliary data daux;
7 if Ri matches with leftmost |Ri| bits of Plain(siTj ) then
8 return 1;
9 else
10 return 0;
11 else
12 return 0;
Algorithm 4: UPDATE by Reader Ri
Input : Plain(siTj ) and reader-ID length |Ri| derived from d
aux
Output: Next-step ID Ri+1 and secret si+1Tj for Ri+1 to verify
1 Ri+1 ← null;
2 si+1
Tj
← null;
3 if the leftmost two consecutive |Ri| bits of Plain(siTj ) is identical then
4 Ri is the last step;
5 si+1
Tj
← Plain(siTj ) with leftmost 2|Ri| bits removed;
6 else
7 Plain(siTj )← Plain(s
i
Tj
) with leftmost |Ri| bits removed;
8 Ri+1 ← leftmost |Ri| bits of Plain(siTj );
9 si+1
Tj
← Plain(siTj ) with leftmost |Ri+1| bits removed;
10 return Ri+1 and si+1Tj ;
2) Key Distribution: STEPAUTH imposes on each reader
only its decryption key, the issuer’s public key, and corre-
sponding domain parameters. In practical supply chains, it is
common that a reader locates on more than one designated
paths. For example, a wholesaler may purchase several types
of products from different distributors and then sell them to
different retailers. For a passing tag, the wholesaler verifies
its secret solely according to whether it is specified as the
current step, no matter which path the tag is traveling. More
specifically, the wholesaler holds a one-to-one mapping with a
step instead of one or more paths. Thus, each step of a supply
chain requires only one decryption key for it to verify step
correctness and update secrets. Since both secret verification
and update need no tag computation, STEPAUTH assigns no
keys to tags.
3) Scalability and Privacy: The length of an initial secret is
linear with path length. Our analysis (Section VI) demonstrates
that secrets for practically long paths can be well supported
by high-memory EPC Gen2 tags. For example, our imple-
mentation of STEPAUTH using ECIES and ECDSA costs 896
bits of secret size per step. A path secret for dozens of steps
can perfectly suit for the memory capacity of, for example,
Marubeni Chemix and Xerafy 8 KB tags [20] and Fujitsu
64 KB tags [21].
Besides, path secrets leak privacy of path length. Longer
secrets indicate longer paths. Given a secret, it is possible to
1556-6013 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2768022, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. YY, MONTH 2017 10
TABLE II
COMPLEXITY FOR THE ISSUER TO INITIALIZE THE STATE FOR AN l-STEP
PATH AND FOR EACH ENROUTE READER TO VERIFY/UPDATE IT.
Issuer Reader
Function INITIALIZE VERIFY UPDATE
Complexity O(l) O(1) O(1)
infer how many steps left for the tag to travel. For example,
the length of a last-step secret is fixed (line 7 in Algorithm 2).
Such a privacy leakage can be easily addressed by adapting
STEPAUTH. Since secret update at each step removes a certain
number of bits from a secret, we can append equal amount of
dummy bits to the secret. To disguise secret-length difference
of paths with different lengths, we can predicate a long enough
path and use its secret length as a baseline. Secrets of shorter
paths can be stretched to the baseline length by appending
dummy bits. For simplicity, we omit appending such dummy
bits in later discussion. We focus more on the privacy of tag
unlinkability and step unlinkability as in the literature.
4) State Extensibility: Current STEPAUTH design encodes
only two identifiers of current- and next-step readers for a
reader to verify. It is straightforward to extend it to encode
additional information in a path secret. For example, a secret
may incorporate an expiration time by which a reader should
process the product. This is useful in a supply chain of short
life-cycle products.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the security and privacy of
STEPAUTH. It turns out to evaluate against what attack
capabilities STEPAUTH can satisfy security and privacy re-
quirements in Section II-C. Security proof demonstrates that
an attacker cannot forge a valid state to pass authentication
without compromising the issuer’s secret key, even if it
can compromise all readers’ encryption and decryption keys.
Privacy proof demonstrates that an attacker cannot breach
tag unlinkability and step unlinkability unless it compromises
readers’ decryption keys. We do not analyze identity/step/path
privacy and path unlinkability as they can be implied by tag
unlinkability and step unlinkability, respectively [7].
A. Security
STEPAUTH can satisfy the security requirement if an at-
tacker cannot obtain the issuer’s secret key for signing path
secrets. That is, the probability for the attacker to forge a valid
path secret is no better than random guessing (Section II-C).
Actually, it might be impossible for any path authentication
protocols to defend against an attacker that have all keys used
for generating valid secrets. We thus design STEPAUTH in
such a way that critical encryption keys are stored in the more
secure issuer. Even if all readers are compromised, an attacker
can only verify and update a path secret instead of forging one.
This renders our protocols more robust than most of existing
path authentication protocols.
Theorem 1. If the hybrid encryption used in STEPAUTH is se-
cure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, a probabilistic
polynomial time bounded attacker without compromising the
issuer’s secret key for signing a valid path p’s secret cannot
Tj
E
D
CA B
Tk
Tj
Tk
Fig. 2. Paths of two tags Tj and Tk with common steps A, B, and C.
forge a valid secret for path p to pass STEPAUTH with
probability better than random guessing.
Proof. Because the signature scheme used in STEPAUTH
should be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks,
it is non-malleable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
[18]. That is, without knowing the issuer’s secret key for
generating the signature for the secret of path p, a probabilistic
polynomial time bounded attacker cannot forge any valid se-
cret for path p with a probability better than random guessing,
even if the attacker is provided with any polynomial number
of valid secrets selected by the attacker.
B. Privacy: Tag Unlinkability and Step Unlinkability
STEPAUTH can guarantee both tag unlinkability and step
unlinkability against an attacker with only eavesdropping
capability (Theorem 2). But both privacy properties will be
breached by a stronger attacker that can compromise any
readers’ decryption keys (Theorem 3).
Theorem 2. Given that no polynomial-time attacker can
break public key cryptography, an attacker with global eaves-
dropping capability cannot breach tag unlinkability and step
unlinkability of STEPAUTH.
Proof. We sketch the proof using two tags with common steps.
As shown in Figure 2, tag Tj takes path
−−−−→
ABCD while tag Tk
takes path
−−−−→
ABCE. Let sATj , s
B
Tj
, sCTj , and s
D
Tj
represent the
secret of Tj at steps A, B, C, and D, respectively. Similarly,
let sATk , s
B
Tk
, sCTk , and s
E
Tk
respectively denote the secret of Tk
at steps A, B, C, and E. We assume that all these eight secrets
may be eavesdropped by an attacker.
Tag unlinkability requires that the attacker cannot correlate
eavesdropped secrets with tags. Note that for the example in
Figure 2, Tj and Tk have same-length paths. They therefore
have same-size secrets at steps A, B, and C. Without loss
of generality, we discuss that among the four secrets—sBTj ,
sCTj , s
B
Tk
, sCTk—eavesdropped at steps B and C, whether the
attacker can infer which of sCTj and s
C
Tk
is derived from sBTj .
For STEPAUTH, we have
sBTj =(EnckeB(k
s
B),EncksB(B,C, s
C
Tj
),
Sigksec(EnckeB(k
s
B),EncksB(B,C, s
C
Tj
))).
If the attacker can determine the preceding equality, it can
correlate sCTj with s
B
Tj
and breach tag unlinkability. Deter-
mining the preceding equality necessitates the knowledge of
encryption key keB of step B, which cannot be inferred by the
attacker. STEPAUTH thus provides tag unlinkability.
Step unlinkability requires that the attacker cannot tell
whether two tags have more than one common step. Note
that it is trivial for the attacker to know that the tags whose
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secrets are eavesdropped at the same step have at least one
common step. Consider, for example, the four eavesdropped
secrets sBTj , s
C
Tj
, sBTk , and s
C
Tk
at steps B and C again. sBTj
and sBTk eavesdropped at step B show that the two tags have
a common step B. To further determine their common step C,
the attacker needs to correlate sCTj eavesdropped at step C with
sBTj and s
C
Tk
with sBTk . This indicates the attacker’s ability of
breaching tag unlinkability and contradicts with the preceding
proof. Therefore, STEPAUTH provides step unlinkability.
Theorem 3. An attacker capable of compromising any read-
ers’ decryption keys can breach tag and step unlinkability of
STEPAUTH.
Proof. We still use the example in Figure 2 to ease discussion.
For STEPAUTH, compromised decryption key kdB at step B
enables the attacker to correlate sCTj with s
B
Tj
and breach
tag unlinkability. Specifically, the attacker uses kdB to decrypt
the first field of sBTj (i.e., EnckeB(ksB)) and obtains ksB. Then
the attacker uses ksB to decrypt the second field of sBTj (i.e.,
Encks
B
(B,C, sCTj )) and obtain sCTj . Furthermore, the attacker
can use kdB to decrypt the following sBTk as well.
sBTk =(EnckeB(k
s
B),EncksB(B,C, s
C
Tk
),
Sigksec(EnckeB(k
s
B),EncksB(B,C, s
C
Tk
))).
Since both sBTj and s
B
Tk
’s plaintexts include steps B and C,
the attacker can determine that their corresponding tags have
at least two common steps B and C. This breaches step
unlinkability.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
In this section, we study an implementation of STEPAUTH
based on the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
(ECIES) [18] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (ECDSA) [19]. ECIES is a hybrid encryption scheme
proven secure against chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext
attackers. We choose ECIES because it is faster with shorter
keys yet guarantees the same level of security in comparison
with other choices with longer keys. To achieve a 128-bit
security, ECIES requires only a 256-bit key while RSA needs
a much longer key of 3072 bits [18]. We choose ECDSA as
the digital signature scheme as it can use the same set of
domain parameters with that of ECIES. Our analysis shows
that the STEPAUTH implementation can generate path secrets
hard to forge yet with sizes affordable to high-memory EPC
Gen2 tags. It imposes minor computation and storage overhead
to the issuer and readers. Comparison results demonstrate that
STEPAUTH is much more efficient than incremental adaptation
of path-grained authentication solutions.
A. ECIES Background
We first sketch how ECIES performs encryption and de-
cryption [35]. A set of domain parameters is shared between
two communicating entities, say A and B. Among the domain
parameters, two critical ones for key generation are generator
point G and the order n of G. Without loss of generality, let
us consider the case when A transmits an encrypted message
to B. We need to generate a pair of keys for B’s public key
cryptography. The private/decryption key kB ∈ [1, n − 1] is
chosen at random. Then the public/encryption key is derived
via scalar point multiplication KB = kBG. Following the
principle of public key cryptography, the encryption key KB
is known to A while the decryption key kB is secret on B.
1) Encryption: To encrypt a message m, A first generates
a random number r ∈ [1, n − 1] and calculates S = rG and
P = (Px, Py) = rKB , where Px and Py are affine coordinates
of point P . A then feeds Px and S to a key derivation function
(KDF) that is constructed from a hash function and generates
two symmetric keys kE and kM. The former is for symmetric
encryption of m as c = EnckE(m). The latter is for HMAC
of the encrypted message c as t = HMACkM(c) toward CCA
security. Finally, the ciphertext A sends to B is (S, c, t), where
S is a compact representation of the elliptic curve point S
under point compression [36].
2) Decryption: Toward correct decryption, B needs also
the two symmetric keys kE and kM, which are derived
from P = (Px, Py) = rKB with the randomly chosen
r unknown to B. B, however, can evolve the equation as
P = (Px, Py) = rKB = rkBG = kBrG = kBS, of which
both factors are known to B as B can recover S from S.
B now can use the same KDF and Px to derive kE and
kM. B first verifies the integrity of the encrypted message by
computing t′ = HMACkM(c) and check the equality of t′ = t.
If the equality check passes, B further decrypts the encrypted
message as m = Enc−1kE (c).
B. STEPAUTH Implementation using ECIES and ECDSA
1) Key establishment: The issuer chooses a set of domain
parameters for ECIES. Upon a reader Ri’s registration, the
issuer sends the domain parameters to Ri. Again, to more of
our interest are the generator point G and the order n of G. Ri
first chooses its decryption key kdi at random from [1, n− 1].
kdi : ∈ [1, n− 1].
Then it sets its encryption key kei using kdi and G.
kei = k
d
i G.
Ri then sends its encryption key kei to the issuer, which
can verify the encryption key with the domain parameters.
Meanwhile, the issuer uses the same set of domain parameters
for ECDSA, which generates keys for signing Ri’s path
secrets. The issuer first chooses its secret key ksec at random
from [1, n− 1].
ksec : ∈ [1, n− 1].
Then the issuer generates its public key kpub using ksec and
G as the following.
kpub = ksecG.
The issuer locally keeps the secret key ksec for signing path
secrets. It sends the public key kpub to all readers for verifying
secret signatures. The issuer and readers communicate through
a secure channel.
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TABLE III
MEMORY COST BY STEPAUTH USING 256-BIT ELLIPTIC CURVE DOMAIN PARAMETERS SECP256R1 WITH 128-BIT AES AND 128-BIT MD5, GIVEN |R|
64-BIT INDEXED READERS (I.E., |Ri| = 64) AND A 128-BIT INDEXED TAG (I.E., |Tj | = 128) STORING SECRET OF AN l-STEP PATH.
Protocol Issuer Reader Tag
STEPAUTH |secp256r1|+ 256(|R|+ 1) < (|secp256r1|+ 512 + log |Ri|+ log |Tj |) 1024 + 896(l − 1)
Notes: |secp256r1| denotes the size of domain parameters. It is around 1546 bits.
2) INITIALIZE (Algorithm 2): Besides encryption key kei
of each enroute reader Ri and secret key ksec of the issuer, the
issuer needs also Ri’s symmetric key ksi to generate the initial
secret s0Tj . Following the ECIES design, the issuer chooses at
random ri ∈ [1, n − 1] and derives ksi out of rkei . The issuer
constructs s0Tj starting from the last step Rl−1 of an l-step
path as the following.
sl−1Tj = Sl−1,Encksi (Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj), tl−1, (7)
where Si is point-compression representation of Si = riG
that encrypts symmetric key ksi . Different from ECIES, tl−1 in
Equation 7 is no longer an HMAC of Encks
i
(Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj).
Instead, it is the issuer’s signature on the first two items using
its secret key ksec under ECDSA.
tl−1 = Sigksec(Sl−1,Encksi (Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj)).
The signature by ECDSA also ensures CCA-security. Follow-
ing the recursive design of INITIALIZE, we can generate s0Tj
by calling the following function.
siTj =
{
s
l−1
Tj
, if i = l− 1;
Si,Encks
i
(Ri, Ri+1, s
i+1
Tj
), ti, if 0 ≤ i ≤ l− 2,
(8)
where we have ti = Sigksec(Si,Encksi (Ri, Ri+1, s
i+1
Tj
)). Note
that siTj corresponds to the secret received by Ri.
3) VERIFY (Algorithm 3): Upon receiving siTj , Ri first
checks whether it is signed by the issuer. To this end, Ri de-
crypts ti and compares the decryption result with the ECDSA-
hash digest of Si and Encks
i
(Ri, Ri+1, s
i+1
Tj
). If the check fails,
Ri rejects the tag. Otherwise, Ri removes ti from siTj and
recovers Si from Si according to domain parameters. Then it
derives the symmetric key ksi using kdi Si and removes Si from
siTj . Ri further decrypts the remaining Encksi (Ri, Ri+1, s
i+1
Tj
)
using ksi and gets Plain(siTj ). Ri accepts the tag if the first
|Ri| bits of Plain(siTj ) match Ri’s identifier.
4) UPDATE (Algorithm 4): Let Ri+1 represent the second
|Ri| bits of Plain(siTj ). If it happens to be Ri+1 = Ri, Ri
is the last step. It simply updates the secret by removing two
Ri’s from Plain(siTj ), which leaves Tj as the final secret. On
the other hand, if Ri+1 6= Ri, Ri+1 would be the designated
next step of Ri. Again, Ri updates the secret by removing the
leftmost 2|Ri| bits from Plain(siTj ). The remaining content
si+1Tj would be the secret for Ri+1, which continues to run
VERIFY and UPDATE toward step-grained path authentication.
C. Memory Cost
The memory cost imposed by STEPAUTH on different
entities (i.e., the issuer, readers, and tags) depends on the
specific configuration of ECIES and ECDSA. Specifically,
we choose the 256-bit Elliptic Curve domain parameters
secp256r1 that provides a 128-bit security [37]. Both of the
issuer’s public key and secret key are 256 bits. Both of the
encryption and decryption keys for each reader are no longer
than 256 bits. The parameter Si is 256 bits. Using 128-bit
AES-CBC without initial vector for symmetric cryptography,
the derived symmetric key is 128 bits. Using ECDSA for
generating secret signature, ti is 512 bits. Table III summarizes
the corresponding memory cost, which is derived next.
The issuer needs to maintain the Elliptic Curve domain
parameters, its 256-bit secret key, and encryption keys of
all |R| readers. According to the specification of secp256r1
[37], the domain parameters take around 1546 bits and yield
encryption keys up to 256 bits in the compact form under point
compression. The memory overhead for the issuer to support
STEPAUTH is thus less than 1546+256(|R|+1) bits. Note that
the issuer may also maintain the sets of reader/tag identifiers
and other supply chain management related information. Such
information is intrinsic for supply chain functioning and thus
not considered as overhead imposed by our STEPAUTH. In
practice, we suggest to choose the size of reader ID |Ri| = 64
bits and the size of tag ID |Tj | = 128 bits. In such case, we
have log |Ri| = 6 and log |Ti| = 7.
Each reader needs to keep auxiliary data mainly including
the domain parameters, a decryption key, and the issuer’s
256-bit public key. Using the secp256r1 domain parame-
ters, a decryption key is no longer than 256 bits. Besides,
the auxiliary data includes also the size of reader identifier
Ri and of tag identifier Tj . A reader requires allocating
additional log |Ri| bits and log |Tj | bits to store reader-ID
size and tag-ID size, respectively, a reader thus takes less
than |secp256r1| + 512 + log |Ri| + log |Tj | bits to support
STEPAUTH.
Tag memory cost is our major concern. Each tag needs
to store a path secret generated by STEPAUTH using the
path the tag should take. If secrets for long paths way
exceed the storage capacity of tags, STEPAUTH would be
impractical. Per STEPAUTH design, the initial secret of a given
l-step path is the longest among all secrets corresponding
to enroute readers. Since STEPAUTH constructs the initial
secret from the last step. We now analyze the size of the
initial secret from backward. The secret for the last step is
sl−1Tj = (Sl−1,Encksi (Rl−1, Rl−1, Tj), tl−1). Note that we use
AES-CBC mode, which guarantees security without initial
vector when used with a random encryption key. Given 64-bit
reader IDs and 128-bit tag IDs, we derive the size of sl−1Tj as:
|sl−1Tj | = 256 + (64 + 64 + 128) + 512 = 1024 (bits).
For one previous step after another, the secret expands with
one Si, two reader IDs Ri and Ri+1, and one ti (Equation 8),
which account for 256 + 64 + 64 + 512 = 896 bits. Then the
size of Ri’s secret is derived as the following.
|siTj | = 1024 + 896((l − 1)− i) (bits).
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TABLE IV
COMPUTATION COST BY STEPAUTH USING SECP256R1 WITH 128-BIT AES AND 128-BIT MD5. THE METRICS ARE THE TIME FOR THE ISSUER TO
GENERATE THE INITIAL SECRET FOR AN l-STEP PATH AND FOR EACH ENROUTE READER TO VERIFY THE SECRET.
Protocol Function Cryptographic Operation Computation Time using Different Benchmarks (ms)
Windows [22] Linux [23]
STEPAUTH Issuer.INITIALIZE (ECIES Encryption + ECDSA Signature)× l (5.65 + 2.88)× l = 8.53l (2.58 + 1.31)× l = 3.89l
Reader.VERIFY ECDSA Verification + ECIES Decryption 2.88 + 8.53 = 11.41 4.07 + 1.75 = 5.82
We, therefore, derive the size of the initial secret s0Tj as
|s0Tj | = 1024 + 896(l − 1) (bits).
Such secret lengths can be practically supported by available
high memory EPC Gen2 tags such as 8 KB tags by Marubeni
Chemix and Xerafy [20] and 64 KB tags by Fujitsu [21]. Even
for a practically long enough path of 100 steps, the initial
secret generated by STEPAUTH is up to 1024+ 896× (100−
1) = 89728 bits = 10.95 KB, which perfectly suits for the
capacity of high memory tags.
D. Computation Cost
We estimate the computation cost brought by STEPAUTH
using the Crypto++ 5.6.0 Benchmarks under both Windows
(Vista 32-bit with Intel Core 2 1.83 GHz) [22] and Linux
(with AMD Opteron 8354 2.2 GHz) [23] environments. Rather
than UPDATE that involves simple string operations, we fo-
cus more on INITIALIZE and VERIFY that enforce complex
cryptographic computation. More specifically, we measure the
computation cost by the time for the issuer to generate the ini-
tial secret for an l-step path and the time for an enroute reader
to verify its corresponding secret. To incorporate a step into the
secret, the issuer performs two cryptographic operations, one
for ECIES encryption and one for ECDSA signature. It thus
takes the issuer (ECIES Encryption + ECDSA Signature)× l
operations to generate the initial secret for an l-step path.
When a reader verifies a secret, it processes data related to only
one step. The reader first performs signature verification and
then ECIES decryption. Table IV summarizes STEPAUTH’s
computation cost. It takes less than 1 s to generate the initial
secret for a 100-step path and around 10 ms to verify a secret.
E. Comparison with Incremental Adaptation of Path-Grained
Authentication
Finally, we quantify the performance gap between the
baseline solution based on incremental adaptation of path-
grained authentication (Section II-D) and STEPAUTH. Among
the existing path-grained authentication protocols listed in
Table I, we choose CHECKER [13] to adapt because its path
secret supports distributed verification. A secret generated by
CHECKER has a constant size of 960 bits; it is verified and
updated step wise. To support a step-grained authentication
of a designated path, the adaptation of CHECKER should pre-
assign a tag’s step-wise secret to each corresponding step along
the designated path (Section II-D). Both the overall commu-
nication overhead for the issuer to transmit these secrets to
readers and the overall storage overhead on readers can be
approximated as the following.
n× l × 960 bits,
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Fig. 3. Comparison of communication/storage overhead on readers between
STEPAUTH and incremental adaptation of CHECKER. STEPAUTH uses 256-bit
Elliptic Curve domain parameters secp256r1 with 128-bit AES and 128-bit
MD5, given |R| 64-bit indexed readers (i.e., |Ri| = 64) and a 128-bit indexed
tag (i.e., |Tj | = 128). CHECKER uses 960-bit secrets.
where we have n tagged products to be delivered along
paths with an average number l of steps. The communication
overhead affects how much time the issuer takes to prepare all
readers with necessary information for secret verification. That
is, it affects the initialization time. Moreover, the storage over-
head on readers affects how much time a reader takes to verify
a secret. The more secrets a reader stores, the longer time it
will take to verify whether a secret is locally stored. On the
other hand, the above overall communication/storage overhead
for our STEPAUTH is as the following (Section VI-C).
l × (|secp256r1|+ 512 + log |Ri|+ log |Tj |) bits.
It is regardless of the number n of tags as STEPAUTH stores
secrets in tags instead of readers.
We compare the overhead of STEPAUTH and the incre-
mental adaptation of CHECKER in Figure 3. The efficiency
superiority of STEPAUTH over the incremental adaptation
intensifies as path length and tag number increase.
VII. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss limitations of STEPAUTH and
provide countermeasures. As our discussions will show, some
limitations affect all path authentication protocols.
A. Hardness of Constant-size Secret
We find it hard for a step-grained authentication solution
to construct constant-size path secrets regardless of the path
length. An ideal constant-size path secret has a fixed size,
whether the corresponding path is as short as one step or as
long as, say, 100 steps. This way, we not only save tag memory
but also protect path privacy in terms of its length. Simply
extending all secrets to the length of the longest path’s secret
by padding dummy bits (Section IV-E) preserves path-length
privacy but consumes tag memory.
We now investigate the impossibility of constant-size path
secrets using the information theory. We deduce the conclusion
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by contradiction whereby we first assume that a constant-
size path secret regardless of path length exists. For ease of
discussion, we consider the entropy of the constant-size path
secrets smaller than a large enough constant C. Take an n-
step path Pn = (R0, R1, ..., Ri, ..., Rn−1) for example. The
initial secret for path Pn should contain sufficient information
for each enroute reader Ri to derive its corresponding path
segment (i.e., (Ri, Ri+1) for 0 ≤ i < n−1 and (Rn−1, Rn−1)
for i = n− 1). Let H(Pn) and H(Ri) represent the entropies
of path Pn’s initial secret and each reader Ri’s corresponding
path secret, respectively. By the Source Coding Theorem [38],
we have the following equation.
H(Pn) ≥
n−1∑
i=0
H(Ri) ≥ nd,
where 0 < d ≤ min{H(Ri) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1}. Given
the assumption that a constant-size path secret exists and its
entropy is less than a constant C, we have C > nd for path Pn
with any length of n. This is contradictory if n is large enough.
Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that a constant-size
path secret regardless of path length. In other words, we have
proven the impossibility of constant-size secret construction
for step-grained path authentication.
B. Impact of Replay/Clone Attack
An attacker may replay eavesdropped valid secrets. Such
a replay attack resonates with clone attacks, which flash
compromised data of a genuine tag to a clone tag. Then
the clone one can behave exactly the same as its genuine
counterpart during authentication. We consider the clone attack
as a concern for not only STEPAUTH but also any other path
authentication solutions. Most clone attacks deploy clone tags
at different places than that of their genuine counterparts [39],
[40]. We find that STEPAUTH can intrinsically filter such clone
tags. STEPAUTH enforces step-grained path authentication.
That is, a secret is deemed valid only at its expected step.
Take state sBTj of Tj at step B in Figure 2 for example. It will
fail authentication at any other steps rather than step B.
A sophisticated attacker may replay a clone tag with the
valid secret at where it is eavesdropped. There are protocols
to detect clone tags colocating with their genuine counter-
parts [30]. However, a smarter attacker would delay replay-
ing/deploying a clone tag, say, with state sBTj at step B after
Tj is shipped away. To detect such clone tags, each step should
maintain a list of authenticated secrets. Then before authen-
ticating each upcoming tag, the reader first checks whether
its secret is already in the list. If yes, the tag is suspicious
and discarded. We suggest how to reduce time and storage
overhead below and leave design details for future work. To
reduce time overhead, a Bloom filter can be introduced to track
secrets in the list [41]. A Bloom filter helps to quickly verify
that a secret is not in the list. Since a secret not in the list
can also be regarded as in the list with a (controllable) slight
probability, we need to search over the list for in-secrets to
avoid mis-regarding genuine tags as clones. To reduce storage
overhead, we can limit the effectiveness of tag secrets within
a certain time duration. Specifically, we divide the time to
epochs and assign each epoch with a unique index. We then
enclose each tag secret with an index of the corresponding
time epoch. A step needs to store authenticated secrets within
only recent epochs.
C. Tolerance of Alternative Paths
It is possible that the only designated path for a product
encounters step failures. When a step failure occurs, we need
alternative paths to deliver the affected product. Alternative
paths come into play upon two cases. The first case is
concerned with dynamic supply chains where new readers may
join and existing readers may leave during products are trav-
elling across the supply chain. In this case, paths are hard to
predict and therefore challenging to pre-generate path secrets.
To our knowledge, there is only one existing work by Cai et
al. [15] to study path authentication in dynamic RFID-enabled
supply chains. The solution therein requires each reader to
query the centralized issuer for online secret verification. All
the other path authentication solutions concentrate on static
supply chains where all valid paths are fixed. The second case
for alternative paths is therefore in such static supply chains.
Since we generate very compact path secret (i.e., 896 bits
per step), it is practical for high-memory tags with dozens
of kilobytes to accommodate hundreds of steps’ secrets. We,
therefore, suggest generating a secret for each of the alternative
paths and store all the secrets in the tag. Then no matter
which path the tag follows, step-grained authentication can
be performed.
We would like to further emphasize that we do not propose
step-grained authentication to replace existing path-grained
authentication. Instead, we consider the proposed solution
much more practically efficient for scenarios where products
do follow designated paths. Typical examples are build-to-
order supply chains and express delivery services for expensive
products. In such scenarios, intermediate readers/steps should
be highly reliable. In other words, even if alternative paths
need to be considered, the number of them should be limited.
We, therefore, consider the size of multiple paths’ secrets
affordable to tag memory; at least we can attach multiple tags
to a product when necessary.
D. Vagueness of Tag-Product Binding
Another concern of STEPAUTH is that incorrect tag-product
binding may make a product delivered toward an unexpect-
ed destination. Consider for example two products A and
B with designated paths of (R0, R1, R2) and (R0, R3, R4),
respectively. We first generate two path secrets. The secret for
product A is stored in tag TA and the other secret in tag TB.
If we attach tag TA to product B by mistake, then product
B will be delivered along A’s designated path (R0, R1, R2),
instead of the expected (R0, R3, R4).
We consider the preceding concern as an intrinsic limitation
of RFID-based supply chain management. It affects not only
any path authentication solution but also other management
operations. The key reason is that in an RFID-enabled supply
chain, tag genuineness is regarded as product authenticity. It
is said that in supermarkets or shopping malls, a customer
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could replace tags on expensive products with those on cheap
ones. This way, the customer can buy expensive products at
lower prices. To put it another way, the information carried
in tags serves as the credential for authenticating products.
Generalizing this to a larger context of authentication, a valid
credential makes any entity pass authentication if the credential
is the solely required factor.
One feasible countermeasure is to attach fragile RFID tags
to products [42], [43]. If an attacker peels off a fragile RFID
tag from the attached product, the tag IC would be completely
destroyed (i.e., break on removal). It is thus impossible for tag
replacement to work. Another feasible countermeasure needs
to introduce additional factors for authentication. Back to the
RFID-enabled supply chain management, product specifics
(e.g., appearance) could be leveraged to strengthen RFID-
based authentication. Take the preceding tag replacement
feasibility for instance again. If the customer sticks a tag
removed from a hundreds-of-dollars TV screen to another
more expensive thousands-of-dollars one, a cautious cashier
would find it suspicious when the customer checks out and
the price prompt on the computer is unreasonably low.
E. Reliance on Secure Channel
As with most RFID path authentication protocols,
STEPAUTH assumes a secure channel for issuer-reader com-
munication. Certainly, it is more practical to remove this
assumption. While existing solutions do not wrestle with an
insecure channel, the focus is how to generate secure and
efficient secrets for path authentication given established keys.
We suggest a lightweight enhancement of the key estab-
lishment process for STEPAUTH. The enhancement imposes
only one more round of communication. The motivation is
to leverage public key cryptography, which is designed for
secure communication over a potentially insecure channel.
Since STEPAUTH requires the issuer to first transmit its public
key kpub and domain parameters to a reader, the goal of
the enhancement is to protect the secrecy of kpub and the
domain parameters. Later messages from the reader to the
issuer can be encrypted using kpub and only the issuer can
decrypt them. To protect the initial issuer-to-reader message,
the reader generates a pair of public key kpubR and secret key
ksecR under any proven secure public cryptography scheme. The
reader manages to obtain a public key certificate for its public
key kpubR and transmits it to the issuer. The issuer verifies the
certificate and if it is correct, uses kpubR to encrypt its message
to the reader, which can decrypt the message using ksecR . After
establishing keys for ECIES and ECDSA, the reader no longer
needs to store kpubR and ksecR . We turn to ECIES and ECDSA
after then because of their high efficiency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed the first step-grained RFID path au-
thentication protocol called STEPAUTH toward combating
counterfeit products in supply chains. Different from prior
path authentication protocols, STEPAUTH enforces a practical
deliver regulation that requires products be delivered along
designated paths. Such a regulation is critical for scenarios like
build-to-order supply chain management and express delivery
service where products are delivered to specific receivers.
STEPAUTH encodes the path into an in-tag secret, which
enables each reader to locally authenticate tag validity and
make delivery decision. What makes STEPAUTH shine more
is that it limits minimal path visibility disclosure between
only adjacent readers. This protects supply chain partners’
privacy such as transaction strategy. Most traditional path
authentication protocols, however, leak more path visibility as
they usually offload path sets to readers. To make STEPAUTH
practically efficient, we leverage nested encryption and hybrid
encryption to quickly generate and verify path secrets. The
generated secrets naturally suit for the storage capacity of
available high-memory EPC Gen2 tags. STEPAUTH guarantees
tag unlinkability and step unlinkability against attackers that
cannot compromise decryption keys on readers. Furthermore,
we prove that STEPAUTH can prohibit an attacker from forging
valid secrets even if it can compromise all readers.
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